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Artification, Fine Art, and the Myth of "the Artist"
  Larry Shiner 
Abstract
I begin by examining three concepts of “artification:”  the decoration,
transformation, and modification.  I argue that the typical business
argument for artification claims that since businesses must be
constantly innovating and since art and artists are the principal locus
of creativity in our society, businesses must be “artified.”  I argue
that these claims about artists and creativity are based on widely
accepted conventional views about art and artists that are false.  I
illustrate my general argument by examining one of the best
statements of the case for business artification, Austin’s and Devin’s
book, Artful Making, showing that artful making is closer to the idea
of craftsmanship than to the modern, post-romantic image of “the
artist,” that seems to enthrall so many people.  I conclude that when
it comes to finding models and metaphors for innovation, businesses
and other organizations could better draw on such fields as science,
engineering, design, or craft than on the world of high art.
Key Words
Nancy J. Adler, Artful Making, artification, artist, Rob Austin, craft,
creativity, engineering, science
 
1. The term “artification” 
In thinking critically about artification I will consider three aspects,
the term, the concept, and the practices that the concept is supposed
to identify.  As a neologism, the term “artification” is a nominative
form of the verb “to artify” which implies that the “art” in question is
a kind of quality or characteristic, similar to the “beauty” in
beautification.  Consequently, “artification” suggests that the quality
of “art-ness,” can be applied to or infused into some object, action,
institution or situation.  I find this a somewhat strained way of using
the term “art,” e.g. it seems quite natural in English to speak of
“making” or “crafting” something, but not “arting” or “artifying” it. 
Moreover, “to artify” is often used in a mocking or satirical sense, e.g.
“my son’s girlfriend decided to “artify” his drab apartment.”  But
whatever concerns one may have about the connotations of the term
“artification,” the philosopher’s primary job is to ask whether the
concept of artification as developed by social scientists and
philosophers is coherent and usefully illuminates the phenomena it is
intended to describe.
2. Three concepts of artification
The term artification covers several concepts.  Leaving aside casual
cases, such as the San Diego Museum of Contemporary Art calling its
teen night “Artification,” I believe there are three main concepts of
artification, which I will call the decoration, transformation, and
modification versions.  The decoration version is seldom explicitly
formulated as part of a scholarly theory, whereas the transformation
and modification concepts have recently been worked out by
philosophers and social scientists.  The decoration version of
artification lies behind such things as the city of New Orleans calling a
project to have artists adorn bus shelters, “artification,” or a writer
on architecture criticizing what he calls the “artification of design.”[1] 
The transformation version of the concept of artification, on the other
hand, refers to a process in which something not initially understood
to be art is subsequently recognized as belonging to the realm of
art.  This usage takes two different forms, an evolutionary approach
according to which humans have an “instinct” for turning all sorts of
things into “art,” and a sociological approach which describes the
ways in which contemporary society bestows art status on such things
as graffiti, hip-hop, vernacular architecture, etc. Artification in the
sense of transforming non-art into art, however, is clearly not what
Saito and Naukkarinen have in mind as the main focus of this special
volume.  Following a more recent usage, first developed in Finland
over the last decade, they envisage artification as a situation in which
some object, activity, or organization, which we do not normally
classify as art, is “affected by art” or “becomes art-like” or at least
uses “artistic ways of thinking and activity,” and yet does not turn
into “art proper.”[2]  
In contrast to the transformation view, we might call this more recent
scholarly concept of “artification” the modification view.  Although the
decoration version of artification suggests a certain the modification
of whatever is decorated, such decoration does not change the nature
of the thing decorated, whereas the modification view that Saito and
Naukkarinen describe implies a deeper or more pervasive alteration
such as businesses hiring artists or adopting processes associated
with the arts in hopes of becoming more innovative.
3. Artification as decoration
Although the remainder of this paper will focus on the explicitly
formulated versions of artification as transformation and modification,
it will help us clarify those explicit concepts by first briefly discussing
the general idea of artification as decoration.  Among the varied
phenomena embraced by the idea of artification as decoration are the
traditional notions of “beautification” and “applied art,” especially as
these have been pursued within the fields of architecture and design. 
In decoration, the “art” is a supplement to something already
existing.  But would it also make sense to use “artification” for such
things as architects’ concern with formal appearance as they design
buildings?  The writer mentioned above who complained of the
current “artification of design” was not concerned about the
“beautification” of existing buildings, but about the tendency of some
architects, such as Frank Gehry or Zaha Hadid, to make the structure
itself into a giant work of sculpture.  If it were possible to completely
ignore practical functions in favor of aesthetic appearance, we could
say that such a building would be totally “artified.”  But such a work
would no longer fit the decoration concept of artification; it would
instead come under the transformation concept of artification, to
which we must now turn.
4. The “art” in “art-ification”
My first step in the analysis of both the transformation and
modification concepts of artification will be to clarify the implicit
assumptions about the nature of the “art” that is involved in “art-
ification.”  Whereas the decoration version of artification seems to
assume something like a formalist or an aesthetic definition of art,
the two versions of the transformation concept of artification assume
either a cluster concept definition of art or an institutional definition
and the modification version of artification seems to imply something
like an historical definition.  Yet, as I have shown in The Invention of
Art:  A Cultural History, underlying all such contemporary definitions
of art is the deeper historical reality of a division in the older and
broader pre-modern notion of art that occurred over the course of
the eighteenth century and continues to shape our thinking.[3]  That
division separated out a new category of “fine arts” (painting,
sculpture, architecture, music, poetry, etc.), along with new fine art
institutions like art museums and secular concert halls.  By the mid-
nineteenth century people began to recognize “Art” as a distinct
realm within the larger society alongside science, politics, religion,
etc.  Of course, we still use something like the older and broader
notion of art when we speak of something as “an art,” or use a
phrase like “the art of . . .” medicine, motorcycle maintenance,
cooking, “the deal,” etc.[4]   Another evidence of this continuing
division is the typical initial response of the public to many of the
avant-garde gestures of the art world, whether to Duchamp’s
notorious Fountain (1917), John Cage’s 4’ 33” (1954), Chris Burden’s
Shoot (1971) or Martin Creed’s The Lights Going On and Off (2001): 
“is it really art?”[5]  Such a question would hardly make sense asked
of the ordinary objects and activities that are the product of “an art.”
 This historical division between the fine arts and ordinary arts or
crafts has important implications for evaluating the different versions
of the concept of artification.
5. The evolutionary version of the transformation concept       
For example, failure to attend to the historical division in the Western
concept of art has led to seriously defective claims on behalf of the
evolutionary version of the transformational concept of “artification.” 
Ellen Dissanayake has long written about “art” as a universal process
of “making special” going back to the earliest humans.  Dissanayake
now prefers to call “making special” a process of “artification,” but
what she describes under that term is in fact very close to the older
and broader concept of “an art.”[6]  Similarly, in The Art Instinct,
Denis Dutton argues for an evolutionary “art instinct,” using a
concept of “art” drawn from Berys Gaut’s “cluster concept” definition
of art.[7]  In Dutton’s adaptation of the cluster concept, something is
“art” if it satisfies any of twelve broad criteria such as pleasure, skill,
style, creativity, representation, form, expression, challenge, etc. 
Thus, both Dissanayake and Dutton, employ a concept of art similar
to the older more comprehensive notion of art, but ignore the
historical division of the eighteenth century in order to emphasize the
elevated connotations associated with the modern notion of high art. 
[See Addendum.]  The conceptual mischief to which this leads
becomes clear in the later parts of The Art Instinct where Dutton
attempts to marginalize entire swaths of contemporary art deriving
from Duchamp as not really art and at the same time embraces
Collingwood’s caricature of craft as the opposite of art, thereby
contradicting parts of Dutton’s own criteria for defining art.[8]  It
does little to illuminate the contemporary world of the arts or even
the transformational sense of artification to mash together things that
are in fact distinct.
6. Advantages of the sociological version of the 
transformation concept
Nathalie Heinich’s and Roberta Shapiro’s sociological version of the
transformational concept of artification, on the other hand, does not
suffer from the kind of conceptual confusion encouraged by
Dissanayake and Dutton.  Their main concern is to trace the
processes by which something moves directly from a non-art
category into the category of art.[9]  Since a main criterion for the
success of such “artifications” is whether some genre or medium is
accepted by one of the social institutions of art (art museums,
concert halls, literary or musical criticism and canons, etc.), the
implicit concept of art most compatible with their work is an
“institutional definition” similar to George Dickie’s.[10]  I also believe
Heinich and Shapiro are giving an account of a contemporary
phenomenon similar to what I describe in the later parts of The
Invention of Art as the historical dialectic of “assimilation and
resistance.”  What Heinich and Shapiro have added to this historical
account is a more detailed look at the various elements and steps by
which what I called “assimilation” and what they call “artification”
takes place.[11]  Heinich’s and Shapiro’s project of exploring the
modalities and processes by which practices, media, genres and
activities of all sorts are taken up into the (fine) art world is to my
mind the most straightforward and defensible use of the concept of
“artification.”
7. The modification concept of artification
The modification concept of artification described by Saito and
Naukkarinen is also clearly based on the modern idea of art as a
distinct domain within society, a domain that has its own institutions,
practices and ideals.  Consequently, the definition of art that would
seem most compatible with the modification concept of artification
would be some kind of an historical definition such as that of Jerrold
Levinson or Robert Stecker.[12]  In contrast to the transformation
approaches, the modification concept of artification does not involve a
direct movement from the category of non-art to the category of art,
but a more circuitous movement in the opposite direction, from the
art world to the non-art world.  And, unlike the decoration
approaches to artification, it involves injecting “artistic ways of
thinking and activity” into non-art institutions so that they become
“affected by art” or even become “art-like.”[13]  Obviously, it would
make no sense to speak of the artification of a business, medical
practice or social service if one understood “art” in the ordinary sense
of “an art” since the practices of business, medicine, social work,
education, etc. are already “art” in the small “a” sense.  Rather, as
Saito and Naukkarinen themselves indicate, the artification that
concerns the modification concept is about the way a business or
other institution is affected by some aspect of  what they call “art
proper,” by art as a distinct and prestigious social realm within
modern Western society.
8. The typical business argument for drawing on 
art and artists
Since the concept of “artification,” as Saito and Naukkarinen describe
it, is a relatively new usage meant especially to capture recent trends
in the world of business, it may be most fruitful to turn our attention
directly to the kinds of practices that the modification version of
“artification” is supposed to capture.  Nancy J. Adler, a McGill
University management professor, describes these practices as
“corporate leaders . . . bringing artists and artistic processes into
their companies.”[14]  Rob Austin of the Harvard Business school and
his co-author, Lee Devin, a former theater professor at Swarthmore,
declare that “successful business processes are becoming more like
art,” and that business innovation requires “an artist-like attitude
from managers.”[15]  The business writings of Adler, Austin and
Devin, and others, that call for a greater rapprochement between art
and business, seem to be based on the following argument:
 (1) Today, businesses must respond to an ever more rapid tempo of
social and technological change in which consumers expect constant
innovation in products and services.
 (2)  If a company cannot match or exceed the appeal of the new
products and services offered by its competitors, it will fail.
 (3) Therefore, finding a path to ever expanding innovation and
creativity is essential to survival and success.
 (4) Traditionally, it is the art world and artists who know the most
about innovation and creativity.
 (5) Therefore, businesses need to draw upon the art world,
especially on artists, in order to become more innovative and
competitive.
Although the first three of these propositions seem intuitively true,
they are empirical questions about social and economic trends
beyond the scope of this paper.  The fourth proposition – that art and
artists are the primary locus of creativity – is the key to the
conclusion that businesses must turn to art and artists if they are to
remain competitive, and it is clearly based on conventional
assumptions about the nature of art and the figure of the artist. 
Although there is no doubt that the concepts of creativity and
originality, for example, have been key elements in the modern ideas
of (fine) art and the artist, I believe there are three crucial errors in
the conventional assumptions at work here.  The first error consists of
a skewed understanding of artists as creators; the second error is the
assumption that it is solely or even primarily from artists that one
can learn about creativity; the third error is a one-sided concept of
creativity as solely a matter of innovation or novelty.
9. An erroneous idea of “the artist”
With respect to the error concerning the figure of the artist, it will
again be helpful to remind ourselves of the historical contingency of
the main features of the post-romantic ideal of art and the artist. 
Just as the older and broader idea of art was divided in the
eighteenth century, so the older idea of what I have called the
“artisan-artist” was split apart, with all the more elevated aspects of
the older image – genius, imagination, creativity, freedom – reserved
for those now termed “artists” whereas those called artisans (later
craftsmen) were said to be merely skilled workers who followed rules,
imitated models, and were motivated by pay rather than by a higher
spiritual calling.  By the early nineteenth century, this modern idea of
the artist reached its near religious apotheosis in the Romantic
movement.[16]  
Along with the ideal of the artist as spontaneous creative genius, no
aspect of the new image of “the artist” was more important than the
belief in the artist’s absolute freedom and independence, an ideal that
developed in response to artists’ actual dependence on the market
economy and the glut of people drawn into fine art by the exalted
image of the artist.  The new complex of characteristics that made up
the image of the artist played itself out over the course of the
nineteenth century in a variety of optional and variously combinable
social poses:  the bohemian, the dandy, the neglected sufferer, the
persecuted rebel, the obsessive creator, the prophetic critic, the
utopian visionary.[17]  As Sarah Burns has shown in Inventing the
Modern Artist, by the end of the nineteenth century, various
combinations of these poses could be found in Britain and America
and, I would add, most of these optional artist’s stances have
continued to be exploited down to the present.[18]   
Nothing points up how ambiguous the meanings of “artist” can be
than references to outstanding businessmen or political figures as
“artists.”  Nancy Adler, for example, cites approvingly Warren Buffet’s
statement, “I am not a businessman, I am an artist.”[19]  Is this just
hyperbole or do Buffet and Adler seriously believe that his success as
an investor is due more to poetic leaps of imagination than to shrewd
analysis?  In the late nineteenth century a prominent publisher wrote
that if department store founder, John Wanamaker, had not been “a
great artist, he could never have founded this unique thing. . . it is
the expression of a great human soul.”[20]  But the idea of the
businessman or politician as creative artist need not always be so
benign.  One recent business writer quotes Joseph Gobbels’ claim of
1933 that he and his fellow Nazis “feel ourselves to be artists . . .
transforming the raw masses into a nation,” and “sweeping away
anything diseased.”[21]  Although all three of these writers seem to
assume that anyone who invents or shapes something is an artist, at
the same time these writers also seem to want us to associate the
businessmen’s and politicians’ name with the elevated overtones
attaching to the post-romantic image of the artist as free creator. 
That kind of ambiguity also seems implicit in Josef Beuys’ famous
declaration that “every human being is an artist,” a statement that,
on the older and broader definition of art (an art), is a truism, but
that gets its provocative edge from the romantic associations of the
term “artist.”[22]
Given the multiple and often conflicting meanings of “artist,” one
always needs to ask which idea of “the artist” is intended when
someone calls for businesses to turn to artists as a means of
becoming more innovative.  Sometimes, it seems that business
writers are merely looking for somewhat more adventuresome
designers.  Nancy Adler writes:  “Creating the next great thing
demands constant innovation; it’s a design task, not merely an
analytical or administrative function.”[23]  Obviously, bringing artists
into a business might stimulate a firm’s existing design staff who
have grown stale from dealing with project deadlines, but that is still
primarily a design function.  In such cases, should we perhaps speak
of “designification” rather than “artification?”  In fact, there is a
recent collection of essays by several distinguished management
professors, Managing as Designing, which contains just such a call for
treating business management as “a design discipline” modeled on
the way architecture and design firms approach their work.[24]    
But, as Naukkarinen points out, businesses that hire artists as
consultants are not just looking for help with design; they are often
more broadly concerned to create an “atmosphere” of creativity.[25] 
This aim seems to reflect some vague notion that having “creative”
people around might cause some of the creativity to rub off, e.g.
“hearing an artist talk about how he creates can help you
create.”[26]  Certainly, part of the socialization of people into the role
of “artist” involves imbibing the ideal of the artist’s absolute freedom,
and perhaps the presence of such people within business, health, or
social service organizations where work is much more structured,
might be liberating in a way.  But does the fact that a business
arranges a few sessions with artists or art groups mean that it has
been “artified?”  I think Naukkarinen is right to point out that for
artists to be effective in helping a business develop a more open
atmosphere, the artists would probably have to have special training
in social psychology and communication – in fact, it might be just as
effective to hire some social psychologists.
10. The error that artists are the primary locus of 
creativity in society
These considerations bring us to the second error at work here:  that
artists are the prime locus of creativity in society.  Sometimes these
claims are merely extended metaphors.  A typical recent book that
uses artistic creativity as a metaphor is John Kao’s Jamming:  The Art
and Discipline of Business Creativity, drawing on improvisation in
jazz.[27]  But Adler seems to go beyond using art merely as a
metaphor when she claims that “historically, such creativity has been
the primary competence of artists, not managers.”  Similarly Austin
and Devin’s book, Artful Making:  What Managers Need to Know
About How Artists Work, declares that managers who understand
“how artists work” will have a competitive advantage in the
future.[28]  No doubt the popular image of the artist does associate
artists with being creative.  But Adler’s statement suggests that
creativity is some kind of specialty like piano tuning or knee surgery,
or that it is something one picks up in art school.  But I doubt if
having an art degree or even a successful career in the art world is
any guarantee of spontaneous “creativity” or the ability to impart it. 
Moreover, psychological studies of creativity have shown that the
popular picture of the artist constantly making “creative leaps” does
not match the actual procedures of most professional artists,
including some famous names such as Alexander Calder or Picasso. 
Gradual development and constant revision are more likely than
occasional moments of sudden inspiration.[29]  In fact, as Philip
Alperson has remarked, there is a “vast spectrum of ways in which
artists work,” a spectrum, I would add, that largely overlaps the
approaches of makers and discoverers in many other fields.[30] 
The general claim that artists are the preeminent specialists in
creativity is not only refuted by empirical studies of artistic creativity
itself, but by the obvious fact that the great mathematical and
scientific discoveries of the past and present have been as much the
result of creative thinking as have great artistic discoveries, and the
same is true of high achievements in design, crafts and engineering. 
Surely, Gustave Eiffel was as creative in his designs as his
contemporary, the painter, Gustave Moreau, and arguably Eiffel’s
work was more creative than many of the scores of now forgotten
artists of his time.  Even a cursory glance at the empirical literature
dealing with creativity will show that the social scientists who study
creativity do not privilege artists over scientists, engineers,
physicians, or workers in other fields.  Even a good mechanic or
cabinetmaker, who possess what Karl Polanyi called “tacit
knowledge,” exercises creative thinking and action much of the time. 
In short, there are both creative and routine aspects to the working
processes of every field of endeavor and the idea that one has to go
to artists and the art world to find creativity is a romantic myth.
11. An erroneous concept of creativity
The third error made by business writers proposing the artification of
business concerns the concept of creativity itself.  Few words have
been as widely abused in Western culture as the terms “creative” and
“creativity.”  By now the market has been flooded not only with self-
help books on how to become a more “creative” person, but
innumerable works on how to inject “creativity” into organizations,
and many consulting firms specializing in “creativity” have emerged. 
No wonder one writer has remarked, “stripped of any special
significance by a generation of bureaucrats, civil servants, managers
and politicians . . . the word  ‘creative’ has become almost
unusable.”[31]  Just as those who claim businesses ought to draw on
artists need to specify just which aspects of the idea/image of “the
artist,” they have in mind, so the intended meaning of “creativity”
need to be carefully thought through.  It will not be an easy task.  For
example, the 2010 Cambridge Handbook on Creativity surveys
hundreds of scholarly books and more than 10,000 papers published
since 1999 alone, reflecting the fact that creativity is an elusive and
highly complex phenomenon that has generated at least ten major
types of theories purporting to explain it.[32]  
A few writers in the management field have drawn on some of this
theoretical and empirical work and attempted to be more critical and
specific in their conceptions of creativity.  One of them is Chris Bilton,
whose book, Management and Creativity, rejects the typical
identification of creativity with spontaneous invention and individual
freedom, ideas typically associated with the romanticized idea of the
artist.[33]  Instead, he argues that, although innovation and
individuality are part of creativity, genuinely creative processes also
involve a context of restraints, application, and collaboration that turn
“original ideas into creative acts.”[34]  Bilton’s position is
corroborated by the definitions of creativity in most of the serious
philosophical and psychological literature today, which reject the
popular equation:  creativity = innovation or novelty.[35]  On the
contrary, unless something new or original is appropriate, useful or
significant within a relevant social context, it may be next to
meaningless.  Kant long ago noted the difference between genuine
originality and what he called original “nonsense.”[36]  
12. A case study of claims for art and artists as models for
management
So far, I have been examining the overly general and highly
ambiguous ways the terms “art,” “artist,” and “creativity,” are used
by many business educators and leaders in search of paths to
innovation.  Now I want to show that even when some of these
writers do become more specific, it may not justify making art the
preferred interlocutor at the expense of things to be learned from
other domains.  For a particularly clear example of the misleading
impression left by focusing solely on art and artists, I want to look
more closely at one of the better books that make the “art” claim,
Rob Austin and Lee Devin’s Artful Making:  What Managers Need to
Know About How Artists Work.  Despite the broad implications of its
title, the book is not about how artists in general work, but only
about a few similarities between how some theater directors manage
actors in play rehearsals are similar to how some successful business
executives manage “knowledge workers” in software development. 
Thus, not only is the “art” involved in “artful making” metaphor
limited to one specific performance art, but even the approach to
rehearsals followed by the particular theater company involved is
admitted by the authors to not be followed by all theater
directors.[37]  
But most tellingly, there are also some serious disanalogies between
directing a play rehearsal and guiding new software development
since theater people normally perform the existing scripts of
playwrights rather than themselves creating new works as software
developers must do.[38]  Moreover, although it is customary to call
theater performances “art” and those who perform in them “artists,”
the terms “art” and “artist” in this usage have a very different scope
and sense than when we speak of playwrights as artists and their
plays as works of art.  To imply that the rehearsal procedures of
certain types of theater companies tell us “how artists” in general
“work,” or to call managers who give their workers freedom to
explore new ideas, “artist-like,” is unjustified hyperbole.  Certainly,
Austin and Devin are right to claim that managing talented and
independent “knowledge workers” is more like managing sensitive
and independent actors than it is like managing assembly line
workers.  But one could draw similar contrasts between managing
assembly line workers and managing talented and independent
athletes, teachers, or scientists. 
13. Craftsmanship as an alternative model for management
Moreover, if we examine the main features of Austin and Devin’s key
concept, “artful making,” the characteristics turn out to be much
closer to the idea of “an art” or a craft than to the meanings we
associate with fine art or “the artist.” After all, the common dictionary
meaning of “artful” is:  “performed with art or skill,” “clever,”
“adroit.”[39]  Consider the key component of “artful making,”
according to Austin and Devin:  “Release.”[40]  By “release” they
mean that managers should facilitate a freely recursive cycle of work
that Austin and Devin name “iteration” in contrast to the highly
controlled “sequential” approach of traditional industrial
processes.[41]  But the “release” involved in this freer way of
managing workers, turns out to be less like “the way artists work”
(after all, many leading visual artists today simply hire others to
make their works) than the way the best craftspeople work.  For
example, in explaining what they mean by “release,” Austin and
Devin draw their initial examples from things like a baseball pitcher’s
throw or a golfer’s swing, whose freedom and fluidity come from long
practice.[42]  
But these are precisely the characteristics of good craftsmanship as
described by Richard Sennett in The Craftsman. Sennett even uses
the same term, “release,” to describe the craftsperson’s “minimum
force,” e.g. a concert pianist’s release of a key at the right instant, a
master chef’s light handling of a boning knife, a Zen archer’s
tranquility at the moment of releasing an arrow.[43]  Moreover,
Sennett applies his account of the craftsman’s freedom in “release” to
such things as the community of Linux software programmers,
precisely the sort of case that concerns Austin and Devin.[44] 
Sennett’s work suggests that one could just as easily say that what
managers need is to become “craftsman-like” as to become “artist-
like.”  In fact, theater performance and directing are themselves
called crafts by many of those who practice them, e.g., John Caird’s
Theater Craft:  A Director’s Practical Companion (2010), or Anatoly
Efros’s The Craft of Rehearsal (2007).[45]
Of course, since the terms “craft” and “craftsman” do not carry the
high prestige and lofty associations of “art” and “artist,” Austin and
Devin’s book would have seemed less startling, if its sub-title had
been “What Managers Can Learn from the Way Craftsmen Work.”[46]
 And since theater performance is “an art,” Austin and Devin are not
wrong to call theater directing “artful.”  The problem is that, although
they are actually using “art” and “artist” in the older more everyday
sense that is closer to “craft” and “craftsman,” their most general
claims suggest the elevated and honorific connotations of (fine) art
and artist.  My critique of their language is not meant to depreciate
their important insights into the management of knowledge workers
or even to dispute the lessons they draw from the theater rehearsal
analogy, but to emphasize again how ambiguous the terms “art” and
“artist” become when used as metaphors or analogies for how to
manage businesses.[47]  Once we press many of these “art”
metaphors, they turn out to be much more limited in their actual
scope than the enthusiastic rhetoric of those like Nancy J. Adler and
some others suggests.
14. Conclusion
Since I have devoted most of the last few pages to a critique of the
practices that the modification version of the “artification” concept
purports to describe, I need to return, in closing, to the question of
the value of the artification concept itself.  Given that one can draw
good metaphors, analogies and models for business innovation from
domains as various as science, engineering, design, and crafts, the
focus on “art-ification” as the primary path to innovation, is surely
exaggerated.  Not only is artification in the modification sense only
one of many possible avenues toward innovation, we have seen that
many of the business writings calling for the modification of
businesses through the arts use the terms “art,” “artist,” and
“creativity” in highly ambiguous and misleading ways.  
I believe that the usefulness of the modification versions of
“artification” will depend on whether its scope as a concept is also
carefully specified and limited.  But if the practices that the
modification version of the “artification” concept is meant to describe
are themselves so varied and ambiguous, the modification version of
the concept of artification, which is supposed to articulate them, may
turn out to be very difficult to clarify.  In the case of the sociological
version of the transformation idea of artification, the criteria for
whether something has been successfully “artified” are relatively
clear (recognition by art world institutions) even if judgments about
particular cases may vary.  But in the case of the modification version
of the artification concept, the criteria for determining whether a
business or other organization has been “artified” seem much harder
to specify.  Given the ambiguities attaching to the underlying
processes that the modification version of artification is meant to
describe, the modification version is likely to remain more of a
metaphor than a coherent concept.
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Addendum:  Dissanayake on Artification
Just before publication of my essay, “Artification, Fine Art, and the
Myth of ’The Artist,’ ” as part of Contemporary Aesthetic’s Special
Volume 4 on Artification, I submitted changes intended to correct its
serious mischaracterization of Ellen Dissanayake’s position on
artification.  Inadvertently, the changes were not included in the
Special Volume version of the essay, so I would like to set the record
straight in this addendum.  The mistake I made occurs in Section 5 of
my essay (The evolutionary version of the transformation concept),
where I treat Dissanayake’s and the late Dennis Dutton’s approaches
to the origins of art as equivalent, claiming that “both Dissanayke
and Dutton employ a concept of art similar to the older more
comprehensive notion of art, but ignore the historical division of the
eighteenth century in order to emphasize the elevated connotations
associated with the modern notion of high art.”  I believe this
statement fairly characterizes Dutton’s work, but I now know that it
is not true of Dissanayke‘s work, which does recognize the historical
division of art into fine art vs. craft that underlies modern, Western
concepts of art.
Some time after submitting my essay I had the good fortune to hear
Dissanayake’s contribution to a symposium honoring the memory of
Dutton and to discuss the issue of artification with her afterward. 
(Her presentation will appear in a future issue of Philosophy and
Literature.)  She made clear her differences with Dutton and
emphasized her agreement with me that the modern difference
between art and craft and is neither an ancient or universal one but
only became established in the Western world after the eighteenth
century.  Dissanayake’s position on artification, therefore, does not
suffer from the conceptual confusions of Dutton’s evolutionary
account of the concept of art.  Along with Roberta Shapiro and
Nathalie Heinich’s sociological approach to the transformation concept
of artification, it is among the most intelligible and defensible uses of
the artification idea.
Published April 17, 2012.
Endnotes
[1] The last mentioned is a blog entitled “The Artification of Design”
by Edo Smitshuijzen of January 28, 2010, at www.a-g-i.org.
[2] Ossi Naukkarinen and Yuriko Saito, “Introduction” to this volume.
[3] Larry Shiner, The Invention of Art:  A Cultural History (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2001).
[4] I could have used any of hundreds of activities but included
phrases from two best selling books in their time, one  toward the
sublime end of the spectrum, Robert Pirsig’s, Zen and the Art of
Motorcycle Maintenance  (New York:  William Morrow, 1974), the
other, toward the ridiculous, Donald Trump’s The Art of the Deal
(New York:  Random House, 1987)
[5] I assume most readers will be familiar with Fountain  and 4’33”;
Burden’s work,  Shoot, consisted in Burden having himself shot in the
arm by a friend, whereas Creed’s The Lights going On and Off, which
won Britain’s Turner Prize in 2001, consisted of an empty room with
the lights going on and off.
[6] Ellen Dissanayake, “The Artification Hypothesis and Its Relevance
to Cognitive Science, Evolutionary Aesthetics, and Neuroaesthetics,”
Cognitive Semiotics, 5 (2009), 148-173.
[7] Dennis Dutton, The Art Instinct (London:  Bloomsbury Press,
2010).
[8] Dutton, The Art Instinct, pp. 193-203, 226-229.
[9] See the summary of their paper for the Ninth Conference of the
European Sociology Association in 2009, “When is Artification?”  At
http://esa.abstractbook.net/abstract.php?aID=2706.  
[10] One reason their approach is most compatible with Dickie’s is
that his view has often been characterized as a more “sociological”
approach, whereas Danto’s version of the institutional theory of art is
more conceptual.
[11] It should be noted that the “resistance” I described as
dialectically related to “assimilation” is not the “resistance” which
they explore (the obvious reluctance of conservatives to accept new
media and approaches).  I was more interested in the fact that the
more insidious class, gender, and economic aspects of the division
between the fine arts and ordinary arts was resisted by many
thinkers, e.g. Rousseau, Wollstonecraft, Emerson, Morris, Dewey, etc.
 Invention of Art, Chapters 8 and 13.
[12] Jerrold Levinson,“Refining Art, Historically,” Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism 48:231-35.  Robert Stecker, Artworks: Definition,
Meaning, Value (University Park:  Pennsylvania State University,
1997).  
[13] Saito and Naukarinen, “Introduction” to this volume.
[14] Nancy J. Adler, “The Arts & Leadership:  Now That We Can Do
Anything, What Will We Do?”  Academy of Management Learning &
Education, 5:4 (2006), 487.
[15] Robert Austin & Lee Devin, Artful Making:  What Managers Need
to Know About How Artists Work (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice
Hall, 2003, pp. xvi, xxii.
[16] As I show in the chapters on the Renaissance and Seventeenth
century,  not only were the terms “artisan” and “artist”
interchangeable at the time (Vasari calls Michelangelo a great
“artifice”), but that we tend to project later post-romantic ideas of
“the artist” onto figures like Michelangelo, Shakespeare, or Bach, who
were all admired as much for their exceptional craftsmanship ability
to meet practical demands of patrons and public as for what later
came to be called “creativity” and “originality.”  The latter were ideals
that only took on their modern form in the eighteenth century. 
Shiner, Invention of Art, Chapters 3-5.
[17] Shiner, The Invention of Art, Chapter 11.
[18] Sarah Burns, Inventing the Modern Artist:  Art & Culture in
Gilded Age America (New Haven:  Yale Unviersity Press.1996).  See
especially her discussion of how Whistler combined several of these
poses, pp. 221-237.
[19] Nancy J. Adler cited in The McGill Reporter, September 2, 2010,
at http://publications.mcgill.ca/reporter/2020/09/nancy-adler-s-
bronfman-chair-in-managem.
[20] Burns, Inventing the Modern Artist, p. 161.
[21] Pierre Guillet de Monthoux, The Art Firm:  Aesthetic
Management and Metaphysical Marketing (Stanford:  Stanford
University Press, 2001), p. 81.
[22] From Joseph Beuy’s, “I Am Searching for Field Character,” in
Charles Harrison and Paul Wood,  Art in Theory 1900-1990:  An
Anthology of Changing Ideas (Oxford:  Blackwell Publishers, 1992).
[23] Adler, “The Arts and Leadership,” p. 490.
[24] Richard J. Boland Jr. and Fred Collopy, eds., Managing as
Designing (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 2004).
[25] See Ossi Naukkarinen’s essay, “Variations in Artification,” in this
volume.
[26] The statement is from Melinda Hart who at the time she made it
(1991) was running an arts program for Southwestern Bell
Corporation in St. Louis.  Quoted by Claudia H. Deutsch, “What Art
Can Teach Business,” New York Times (Sunday, September 8, 1991),
p. 23.
[27] John Kao, Jamming:  The Art and Discipline of Business
Creativity (New York:  Harper & Row, 1996).
[28] Austin and Devin, Artful Making, pp. 1, 27.
[29] An early study is Robert W. Weisberg, Creativity:  Genius and
Other Myths (New York:  W. H. Freeman, 1986).  Paul J. Lochner,
“How Does a Visual Artist Create an Artwork?” in James C. Kaufman &
Robert J. Sternberg, eds., The Cambridge Handbook of Creativity
(Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 131- 144,
summarizes recent studies.  The biographer Andrew Robinson has
drawn on some of this material along with much anecdotal evidence
for his recent Sudden Genius? The Gradual Path to Creative
Breakthroughs (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2010).
[30] Philip Alperson, “Creativity in Art,” in Jerrold Levinson, ed., The
Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics (Oxford:  Oxford University Press,
2003), pp. 249-50.
[31] J. Tusa, On Creativity:  Interviews Exploring the Process
(London:  Metheuen, 2003), pp. 5-6.
[32] Kaufman &. Sternberg, eds., Cambridge Handbook of Creativity,
p.xiii.  The essay by Aaron Kozbelt, Ronald A. Beghetto, and Mark A.
Runco on “Theories of Creativity,” for example, identifies ten major
types of theories on the nature of creativity, some emphasizing the
study of personality traits, others the process of creation, others the
nature of creative works, other the contexts that support creativity,
pp. 20-47.
[33] Chris Bilton, Management and Creativity:  From Creative
Industries to Creative Management (Oxford:  Blackwell Publishing,
2007).
[34] Bilton, Management and Creativity, p. 7.  A similar point is made
by Robinson in Sudden Genius?  The Gradual Path to Creative
Breakthroughs, pp. 316-27.  
[35] For a summary see Robert J. Sternberg and James C. Kaufman,
“Constraints on Creativity:  Obvious and Not So Obvious,” in their
Cambridge Handbook of Creativity, pp. 467-68.
[36] Immanuel Kant, Critque of Judgment (Indianapolis:  Hackett
Publishing, 1987), p. 188.  This is from paragraph 50 “On the
Combination of Taste with Genius in Products of Fine Art.”  While the
nature of the contextual constraints that make one art work
“creative” and another work “ordinary,” different from those in
science, engineering or design, the historical constraints of what
counts for “innovative” in the “Artworld” at any one time are
obviouslly very real.
[37] Austin and Devin, Artful Making, p. 21.
[38] Austin and Devin too easily dismiss this as irrelevant by arguing
that all performances are interpretations.  Artful Making, pp. 36-37. 
Obviously, there are also improvisational theater or comedy
companies that take themes from audiences and make up sketches
as they go along, but this is not the primary example actually used by
Austin and Devin. 
[39] One can’t help thinking of Dicken’s pickpocket character in
Oliver Twist, nicknamed “the Artful Dodger.”
[40] The principal components of “Artful Making” are:  Release,
Collaboration, Ensemble, Play.  The name of the last of the stages  is
obviously drawn from their theater analogy, “play” being the
equivalent of what we would normally call in business, the “product;”
in this case, a product which results from a Collaboration that leads
to a group of workers becoming an Ensemble.  Austin and Devin,
Artful Making, pp. 15-17.
[41] In the traditional production of something like automobiles, the
start up costs for new models are so high that managers cannot
afford the free experimentation characteristic of the iterative process;
but in the “knowledge industries” like software production, the
material costs of trying out new models are so low that many things
can be tried and cast aside. Thus, the iterative process of “artful
making” is a matter of constant “reconceiving,” whereas the
sequential process of “industrial making” aims at “replicating” a pre-
specified outcome.  In “artful making,” therefore, the manager’s role
is that of a facilitator.  Austin & Devin, Artful Making, p. 98.
[42] Austin and Devin, Artful Making, pp. 86-88.
[43] Richard Sennett, The Craftsman (New Haven:  Yale University
Press, 2008), pp. 165-167.
[44] Sennett, The Craftsman, pp. 21-28.  In fact, when it comes to
an appropriate analogy for developing software, one should note that
Malcolm MuCullough, Professor of Information Design at the
University of Michigan, has devoted an entire book to computer
craftsmanship, Abstracting Craft:  The Practiced Digital Hand
(Cambridge:  MIT Press, 1998).
[45] John Caird, Theater Craft:  A Director’s Practical Companion
from A to Z (London:  Faber and Faber, 2010), and Anatoly Efros,
The Craft of Rehearsal:  Further Reflections on Interpretation and
Practice (New York:  Peter Lang, 2007).
[46] It is interesting to note that R. G. Collingwood, whose narrow
and prejudiced concept of “craft” has offered intellectual justification
for its low status among artists and philosophers, did not describe
what the most accomplished craftspeople do, but attributed to all
craftspeople precisely the kind of rigid, planned in advance approach
that Austin and Devin call the “replication” model of “industrial
making.”  Collingwood and those who follow him, like Dutton, treat all
craft as a matter of routine artisanal work or industrial operations.
[47] One of the things that makes Austin and Devin’s book stand out
among the many vague and ill formulated calls for transforming
business through art and artists, is that it is much more specific and
nuanced in its presentation.  For example, they recognize that what
they call “artful making” is not appropriate to all business and
industries, that many businesses combine iterative and industrial
processes, and that “artful making” is not always the best approach
even for achieving innovation. (Artful Making, pp. 50-52).   
                                                                      
                                                                                                           
